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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MU.TON L. WEILENMAN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

GRANT BLACKHURST MORRELL,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
12421

BRIEF O,F APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of a two car intersection accident.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court entered a judgment on a jury verdict
for plaintiff in the amount of $12,782.50.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the lower court judgment and an order directing the lower court to grant
judgment in his favor as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial.
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as they app d .
the lower court. All italics have been added eare .in'
un 1ess 1n.
dicated otherwise.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 7:00 a.m. on the morning of Oc.
tober 18, 1968, plaintiff was traveling south down l
Street on his way to a political breakfast (R. 160). He
had used this same route to go to work every day for
over two years. At that hour it was still dark necessitating
use of the automobile headlights (R. 161). As heapproached the intersection of 11th Avenue with I Stretr
he looked to the right, noticed that there was no traffic
at the stop sign on his right and continued into the inrer·
section (R. 163). He did not look further up 11th Avenue
to ascertain if there was traffic approaching the intersec·
tion though the visibility is such that he could have seen
for at least one block (R. 188). The defendant's auromobile would have been somewhere on that block at tht
time plaintiff limited his lookout to the area of the stop
sign.
Plaintiff related at trial that the next thing be re· ·
membered after was the noise of the collision with the
defendant's car (R. 163). Mr. Morrell, the defendant.
was knocked unconscious by the impact. His last recol· 1
lection was driving east on 11th Avenue at 40 miles an ,
· · h t be was ·
hour with his lights on low beam recogmzmg t a
1
.
·
d
k
·
that
he
should
stop
i
approachmg a stop sign an
nowing
:
1'

at I Street (R. 201).

'
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The investigating officer found that the light switches
in both vehicles were pulled to the "on" position and that
tht: brakes in both vehicles were operational (R. 152).
There was no witness who could testify whether Mr.
Morrell had stopped at the stop sign.
The only evidence whether plaintiff in fact saw the
defendant's car was plaintiff's recollection that there was
a street light at the intersection (R. 163) when in fact
the only illumination would have come from the automobiles' headlights (R. 158).
The impact of the accident threw defendant's car in
the direction of plaintiff's travel where it finally came to
rest some 57.6 feet from the southeast boundary of 11th
Avenue. Plaintiff's car stopped approximately on the
southeast corner of the intersection. See Exhibit 1-P.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW FOR FAILING TO
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT.
,,.

It is well-settled law that a driver who looks and
fails to see the obvious, or fails to look, is negligent as a
matter of law.
The case of Johnson v. Syme, 6 Utah 2d 319, 313
P.2d 468 (1957), is on all fours with the present matter.
In Johnson the plaintiff was driving on a four-lane divid-
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ed highway in the nighttime. The defenda , d
nt s ecc'C!eni
entered onto the highway from the plaintiff' · h .
•
S rig t With.
out stoppmg or slowing down for the stop · d . .
sign es1gned
to protect highway traffic and was struck b th
.
Y e plain.
"ff'
.
.
t1
s car. At trial the plamtiff admitted b ·
. .
.
erng ven
familiar wtth the intersection and stated th t h ·
a s e sa~
nothing ~ntil th_e car in which Mr. Syme was killed ap.
peared directly m front of her at a distance of 20 to 111
feet.
.
On the above facts this court stated:
"Under such conditions we cannot but con·
elude that plaintiff either looked and failed to set
the obvious or failed to look at all and, as a matter
of law negligently contributed to her own injurie1
and the death of another motorist." 313 P.2a
at 469.
This case presents the same essential elements found
tn Johnson: the accident occurred during darkness IR
161), plaintiff was on the favored road and defendant on
the disfavored road, plaintiff was familiar with the inre1·
section (R. 183) and the plaintiff struck the defendanr'1
automobile as the latter entered the intersection from the
plaintiff's right (R. 163).
In ] ohnson the plaintiff never saw the defendant un·
til it was too late to avoid the accident. In this case tbr
plaintiff admitted having never seen the defendant un~
. the co 111Slon
. · (R · 163) · At trial D<
actually involved m

stated:
"I looked to the right and to the left, thencotbo·
·
·
I then beard '
tinued through the 10tersect10n.
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noise of the collision and that was the extent of

my knowledge of what occurred." (R. 163)

Also at trial plaintiff asserted that his duty with rethe defendant ended at his looking to see if any
automobile was stopped at the stop sign as he approached
the intersection. He stated:
~pcct to

"My responsibility was to look at that stop
sign and see if there was a car at that stop sign."
(R.186)

*

*

*

"I saw no car at the stop sign. I was not con-

cerned whether or not there was a car behind the
stop sign because the stop sign was there. I had
gone down the road day after day for better than
two years, and had the right to assume that if there
was a car beyond that stop sign-" (R. 185)
Plaintiff's legal duty did not end with a simple glance
see if any traffic was at the stop sign. Obviously the
stop sign itself is incapable of preventing a car from passing through without stopping. Indeed it was possible for
the plaintiff to see traffic conditions for a distance of at
lc:a>t one block up I I th A venue (R 188). It cannot be
disputed but what the defendant was somewhere on that
block, at the stop sign, or already in the intersection.
Plaintiff therefore failed to see what was there before
his eyes.
to

The reason why the law requires one to keep a proper
lookout is to place upon every driver the duty to avoid
accidents. As such, a lookout like that given by plaintiff
ivhich ends at the simple determination of which street
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has the favored traffic flow does not fulf'll h
.
t
t e duty of
keepmg a proper lookout.
, In Co~klin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P.Zd •
41
( 1948), this Court held, on facts similar to th
e present
matter, that:

"The duty to keep a proper lookout appliei
as well to the favored as to the disfavored d ·.
mer
.h d .
N ett
er river can excuse his own failure to ob:
serve because the other driver failed in his du~.

*

*

*

"There is still a duty on the part of the driver
traveling the arterial highway to remain reason·
ably alert to the possibility of the disfavored driver
starting across the intersection in the belief that
he can cross in safety." 193 P.2d at 439.
Because the plaintiff admitted he could have seen
further up 11th Avenue than the area of the stop sigi:
to which he limited his lookout and because plaintiff
never saw the obvious in that he admitted he was actualh
involved in the collision when he first saw defendanr'
automobile, plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law.
Defendant's Motion to this effect before the trial cour1
was denied <°R. 194). That denial constituted reversible
error.
For other cases relevant to this issue see Minqris 1
Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495 (1949); Co~ 1
Thompson 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d 1047 0953); Coi·mg·
'
;61·
ton v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P.2d 788 (19 ·
09481
Hickok v. Skinner 1 113 Utah 1, 190 P.2d 5l 4
;
62
Martin v. Ehlers, 13 Utah 2d 236, 371 P.2d 851 09 '
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JnJ J3emon v. D & R G Western RR, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286
P.2d 790 (1955).
POINT II
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDIOAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 16.

Instruction No. 16 was submitted by plaintiff (R.
S(1I. It reads:
You are instructed that when the law says
that one person has the right-of-way over another,
it simply means that such person has the immediate privilege of occupying the space in question and other persons must yield to such person.
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant either entered the intersection without stopping at the stop sign or stopped first and then failed to yield the right-of-way,
you are instructed that you must find said defendant was negligent. If you further find that such
negligence proximately caused damages to the
plaintiff, Milton L. Weilenmann, then you must
find the issues in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant and assess damages in accordance with
these instructions, unless you further find from a
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was
himself guilty of negligence which proximately
caused his own damages. (R. 61).

This instruction told the jury the defendant was
negligent if he entered the intersection without stopping.
It constituted prejudicial error because it presented to the
Jury an issue for which there was no evidence: There was
no witness who could say whether the defendant had
stopped at the stop sign. Mr. Morrell was knocked un7

•
conscious by the impact and had no recoil ect1on
. · whetht,
he had stopped before entering the intersectio n. He die·
recall that there was a stop sign ahead and th at he 1nrena
·
ed to stop at this intersection (R. 201).
It is the law of this state that instructions should f:·
the facts of the case. Johnson v. Cornwall Wareh Oli!t
Co., 16 Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24, 25 (1965). It is furthe:
the law that,
"A choice of probabilities creates only a basi.
for conjecture on which a verdict of a jury cannn:
stand.

*

*

*

"One may only speculate as to the circum
stances immediately p r i o r to the collision.'
DeMille v. Erickson, 23 Utah 2d 378, 462 P.!:
159, 161-62 (1969)
In addition, Instruction No. 16 was prejudicial be
cause it failed to tell the jury that if the defendant enteree
the intersection first, and at a time when Mr. Weilenmanr
was not so close as to constitute an immediate hazari
the defendant and not Mr. Weilenmann had the right0i
way.
This principle of law is found in the Utah Mow:
Vehicle Code:

41-6- 74. Vehicle entering a through higDway. - [(a)] The driver of a vehicle shall sti':
as required bv this act at the entrance to a throut
highway and' shall yield the right of way toot'
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vehicles which have entered the intersection from
said highway or which are approaching so closely
0 11 wid through highway to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver having so yielded may
proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield the right of way to the vehicle so
proceeding into or across the through highway.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop
in obedience to a stop sign as required herein at
an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one
or more entrances thereto although not a part of
a !hrough l-'.i.'.;hway and shall proceed cautiously,
yield right of way to vehicles not so obliged to
stop which are within the intersection or approachi11g so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard,
hut t'f'ay then proceed.
Without stating the full requirements of the statute
the instruction had the effect of stating the defendant's
entrance into the intersection controlled by a stop sign
and involvement in an accident amounted to prima
facie evidence that plaintiff had the right of way. This
court specifically held in Johnson v. Cornwall Warehouse
Co., 15 Utah 2d 172, 389 P.2d 710 (1964), that such an
instruction was prejudicial.
Under Johnson the jury should not have been allowed to find the defendant negligent without first inquiring whether the plaintiff was in the intersection or so
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard to
defendant's entering or proceeding into the intersection.

9

Because nowhere in the charge were th .
•
d
.
e Jurors S<J
mstructe , Instruct10n
No. 16 was dul Y ob'Jected to a,
•
•
was lnstruct10n No. 20 for the same reason (R • 2)9·6!1
The error
. .in giving this instruction exc 1ud'ing ai
important principle of Utah law was likely aggravat~
when plaintiff's counsel in summation stated , as to tutL
plaintiff:
.

. "[H]ad ~e actually seen that automobile nt
still had the right to continue along that highwa ·
(R.112)

)·

The defendant submits that leaving the jury free 11
speculate on the facts and then apply them to an incom
plete rule of law was prejudicial error.
POINT III
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ER·
ROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 19.

Instruction No. 19 was plaintiff's requested Insuu1
tion No. 6 (R. 87). It states:
You are instructed that a driver on a St!('f.
protected by stop signs has the right-of-way 01 ~
traffic approaching on the cross-street and has tli
right to assume that such traffic will not enter tli
intersection against the stop signal. ~e may.~
tinue to rely upon such an assumpt10n unul
sees or in the exercise of reasonable care sboul:
hav~ seen, that the other vehicle is going to pn•
ceed against the signal. (R. 64)
·
6 d 2ot1u'
The impression given by Instrucuons 1 an
•. ·
· ' hides wou;.
any accident occurring between the parties ve
10

be due to the negligence of defendant because he was on

rhe srreet with the stop sign was aggravated by Instruction No. 19.
This instruction was offered by plaintiff (R. 87). It
appears to have been fabricated in part from JIFU 21.18.
Indeed the last sentence is taken almost verbatim from
that JIFU instruction.
It is significant to note that the JIFU instruction is
for one based on an intersection controlled by traffic signals as opposed to stop signs. While the first part of
Instruction No. 19 uses the terminology stop sign, stop
signal or signal is the terminology of the remainder of
the instruction.
It is significant that this instruction was taken from

JIFU 21.18 in showing that it established a misleading
standard. The last four words of the instruction "proreed against the signal" is proper only when applied to a
traffic semaphore situation. In such situations it is improper to proceed into the intersection against a red light.
However, on an intersection controlled only by a stop
sign, one is not negligent for entering an intersection
controlled by a stop sign. A stop sign is not the equivalent of a continuous red stop light.

•

Instruction No. 19 may correctly state the law with
respect to traffic signals; it is misleading and incomplete
as to intersections controlled by stop signs.
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4i

Technically one does not proceed against
· a stop .
unless there is other traffic in or so near th .
sig:
.
e 10tersecoo·
as. to constitute
an
·
"
.
. immediate hazard · Th'is 1nstructM
gives the impress10n that any entrance to th e llltersecno·
·
.
by the defendant is negligence and "against the signal
·
1

This
instruction shows the danger of fab r1catrng,
· ·
.
~nstruction f~om another based upon different lega
principles. Especially in the context of other legallr in
complete instructions it cannot be said that such a~:~
struction accomplished the object of enlightening the jur.
on their problems, ] ohnson v. Cornwall Ware house (1,
16 Utah 2d 186, 398 P.2d 24 (1965), but merely added 1
.

JU?'

the confusion.
CONCLUSION
This case presents an important question of puol
policy: Can the duty of every motorist to keep a pro~:
lookout in order to avoid accidents be fully satisfied f
a mere glance towards the intersection to assure he is 1r
the favored street? Defendant submits that one's dui
of proper lookout cannot be thus satisfied.
Though plaintiff could easily have seen all them
fie to his right for over one block's distance he mac.
no effort to ascertain if there was any traffic behind c
area immediately adjacent to the stop sign. It is beiK
dispute that defendant's automobile was somewher~wic
in that one block area when the plaintiff made his fll''
·
h
h plaintiff f~k
ing glance. It logically follows t at t e
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ro

observe what was plainly visible. This was negligence

,is

a matter of law.

The jury could only have avoided finding the plainriff negligent as a matter of law upon incomplete or misleading instructions. Failure of the trial court to properly
instruct the jury according to the standards set forth by
the Utah statutes laid the groundwork for the jury's improper verdict excusing the plaintiff from his duty to
.:xcrcise a proper lookout.
Respectfully submitted,
Raymond M. Berry
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
7th Floor Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant
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MAILING NOTICE
I hereby certify I mailed two copies of the foregoU.
brief, postage prepaid, to John L. Black, 530 JudgeB~
ing, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
day of MJr,
1971.

